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 On October 30, 1924, G. H. Colvin, vice president of the Farmers and Mechanics National Bank 
of Fort Worth, invited a group of fourteen local businessmen to a protest meeting against heavy 
taxes on the rich. The purpose of the meeting was to demand a reduction in estate taxes and in 
the highest marginal rates of income tax. The assembled citizens denounced these taxes as “a 
serious handicap in financing development enterprises necessary to the progress and growth of 
our section of the country.” After discussing the evils of high tax rates and the merits of the tax 
cuts proposed by Treasury Secretary Andrew Mellon, they voted to urge Mellon to consider even 
deeper income tax cuts for the rich—a maximum surtax rate of 15 percent would be ideal, they 
agreed, instead of the current 40 percent, or Mellon’s preferred 25 percent. They then elected a 
resolutions committee that would draft petitions communicating their demands to the Treasury 
and to their Congressman, Fritz Lanham, who had voted against the Mellon tax cuts the previous 
spring. They also delegated a group of “leading taxpayers and most active business men” of Fort 
Worth to meet with Lanham and deliver their message in person. “[W]hile we may not be able to 
convert him to our way of thinking,” Colvin wrote after the meeting had adjourned, “we will at 
least deliver our souls and discharge our responsibility as citizens to our government.” With that, 
the first Texas tax club had formed.1 
Within three months, there were more than two hundred such clubs in cities and small 
towns throughout the state, and within a year G. H. Colvin was the chairman of a statewide 
league of dues-paying Texas tax clubs with its own letterhead that was sending grassroots 
delegations to Washington, D.C., to lobby for the so-called Mellon Plan, which targeted tax cuts 
to the richest Americans.2 Both contemporary observers and subsequent scholars have credited 
the Texas tax clubs with swaying Congress, and Representatives William Green (R-Iowa) and 
John Nance Garner (D-Tex.) in particular, in favor of the Mellon Plan, and thereby bringing 
about the tax cuts in the Revenue Act of 1926—which included the steepest cut in top marginal 
tax rates in American history.3 
 But who were these tax club activists, and why did they mobilize a grassroots movement 
in support of the Mellon Plan? The tax club movement appears to present a sociological 
anomaly—a movement demanding collective benefits for people richer than themselves. Few of 
the activists could have expected to receive a tax cut if their demands were granted. Almost no 
one in Texas owed income tax at the top rates. The income of the United States was heavily 
concentrated in the cities of the industrialized Northeast, and generations of agrarian radicals had 
fought for the progressive income tax precisely because it favored the sectional interests of the 
rural South and West.4 Most observers in the 1920s would have assumed that a steeply 
progressive federal income tax was good for Texas. 
 Previous scholars have attempted to explain this anomalous movement by depicting the 
Texas tax clubs as puppets of an eastern industrial and financial establishment. Most accounts of 
the Mellon Plan focus on “corporate elites” or “financiers and industrialists” who used their 
financial power to create a “vast propaganda machine” on behalf of the tax plan.5 The 
implication is either that the tax clubs were hired, or that they were misled. I will argue instead 
that the tax club activists knew what was in the Mellon plan, and supported it because they 
believed it dovetailed with interests of their own. The tax clubs were organized by mortgage 
bankers who saw income tax cuts as a way to deprive their competitors of capital. In particular, 
they reasoned that cutting the top rates of income tax would deprive the newest entrants into the 
farm mortgage market—the so-called land banks—of a valuable tax exemption. 
 
<1> The Politics of Mortgage-Backed Securities  
The land banks were a new category of lending institution created by the Federal Farm Loan Act 
of 1916. The American Bankers’ Association had pushed for this legislation, whose purpose was 
to reduce the risks of farm mortgage lending, thereby providing more income security for lenders 
and easing the availability of credit for farmers. The law combined several innovations inspired 
by Danish and German cooperative farm loan associations. One was the mortgage-backed 
security. The law created two new categories of land banks, the Federal Land Banks and the 
Joint Stock Land Banks, both of which were authorized to issue bonds backed by mortgage 
certificates. This innovation reduced the risks of nonpayment by bundling together mortgages. 
Another such innovation was cooperative governance: each Federal Land Bank was to be 
governed by an association of farmers, who would use their local knowledge to screen 
borrowers, and who were incentivized to screen carefully by the requirement that they 
collectively co-sign each mortgage note. The land banks were supposed to expand and stabilize 
the market. They were subject to lending limits and detailed regulations that, it was thought, 
would limit their competition with existing banks.6 
The American Bankers’ Association had supported this legislation in hopes of creating a 
new category of intermediary institutions that could reduce the risks of mortgage lending in the 
volatile farm real estate market. But under pressure from organized farmers, Congress included a 
provision that made it easier for the new land banks to raise money independently—and thereby 
transformed them from potentially stabilizing intermediaries to potentially destabilizing 
competitors. In particular, farmers lobbied successfully for a federal subsidy for the land banks, 
in the form of a tax exemption for the interest income on the mortgage bonds that they issued.7 
With this tax exemption, the new land banks could raise money independently of existing 
country banks—and on more favorable terms. Existing farm mortgage banks could only raise 
capital by issuing stock or taxable loan instruments such as certificates of deposit—unless they 
reorganized themselves as Joint Stock Land Banks, and thereby subjected themselves to new 
regulations and lending limits that could substantially curtail their profits.  
Bankers denounced the tax exemption as “socialistic” and “class legislation.”8 The 
American entrance into World War I delayed implementation of the Act, but when the land 
banks began to issue loans after the war, the mortgage banks responded with a renewed 
campaign to repeal the tax exemption. The Farm Mortgage Bankers’ Association of America 
described the tax exemption as a “life or death” issue for its members. It distributed a circular 
warning rural mortgage banks that “the Federal land bank and joint-stock land banks are 
covering the best fields and loan in such sums of money that no legitimate mortgage company 
can long meet the competition if the tax exemption feature is allowed to remain.” Senator Reed 
Smoot introduced legislation to repeal the tax exemption, and the Senate Committee on Banking 
and Currency held hearings on the issue in 1920.9 
The struggle over the tax exemption almost put an end to the nascent land banking 
system. In 1919, Charles E. Smith, a shareholder in the Kansas City Title and Trust Company, 
sued in U.S. District Court to enjoin the company from investing in tax-exempt land bank bonds 
on the grounds that they were authorized by an unconstitutional law. It was openly 
acknowledged that this was a test case brought on behalf of the mortgage banking industry.10 The 
suit effectively froze the land banks’ market share by stopping them from issuing of their bonds. 
Although the case took years to wind its way upward to the Supreme Court, in the meantime the 
mere fact of the lawsuit created the perception of a substantial risk that the land banks might be 
declared unconstitutional—and therefore that their bonds might not be repayed. It was enough to 
make the bonds unmarketable until the case was resolved.11 
But the resolution of the case was not favorable for country bankers. The Supreme Court 
finally ruled that the land banks were constitutional in February 1921 (Smith v. Kansas City Title 
and Trust Company [255 U.S. 180]), unleashing new federally subsidized competitors in the 
farm mortgage banking market—just as a farm investment bubble burst. High agricultural profits 
during World War I had led many farmers to expand production, and to finance that expansion 
with debt that they found they could not pay off when prices fell. The recession of 1920 triggered 
a wave of mortgage defaults and foreclosures that undermined the solvency of small, rural banks. 
Even after farm prices began to recover, the bank failure rate continued to climb, as small banks 
that were close to failing sought to recover their losses by betting on ever-riskier investments. It 
was the first great systemic bank failure of the twentieth-century United States.12 
Rural mortgage bankers saw the Mellon plan as a solution because it promised to reduce 
competition in the industry—by taking away the advantage of tax-exempt financing enjoyed by 
the land banks. The promise of abolishing tax-exempt financing was in fact the crux of the plan 
as it was outlined in Mellon’s 1924 tract, Taxation: The People’s Business. The thesis of the 
book was what would later come to be called a supply-side argument for tax cuts: Mellon argued 
that cutting income tax rates would actually bring more income tax revenue, not less, because 
cutting rates would encourage economic growth and thereby give the government more income 
to tax. But unlike later versions of the supply-side doctrine, Mellon’s version asserted that the 
particular problem with high tax rates was not that they discouraged investment altogether. It 
was that they encouraged “the flight of capital away from taxable investments” and toward tax-
exempt bonds. Mellon’s preferred solution was a constitutional amendment to eliminate the tax 
exemption for government bonds. In the meantime, he argued for lowering tax rates on the rich 
on the grounds that it would decrease the value of the tax exemption.13 
As Mellon described it, the point of cutting taxes on the rich was to make taxable 
investments more attractive, and thereby to increase government revenue. If tax rates fell, then 
more rich people would invest in taxable securities rather than tax-exempt bonds; more income 
would start to show up on the tax returns of rich investors; and more revenue would start to flow 
into the Treasury. The tax club activists agreed that cutting the tax rates on the rich was an 
important step to lure investors away from tax-exempt bonds. But the way they saw it, the point 
of luring investors away from tax-exempt bonds was not to increase government revenue. It was 
to take away the unfair advantage enjoyed by the land banks. 
 
<1> The Tax Club Movement  
 
The country bankers’ enthusiasm for the Mellon plan took even supporters of the plan by 
surprise. The organizer J. A. Arnold had traveled around other states of the South for months 
trying to stir up sentiment for the Mellon plan without much success. And then he arrived in 
Texas. The October 30 meeting in Fort Worth was just the start. The tax club idea spread, slowly 
at first—Dallas on November 6, Houston on November 10, Beaumont on November 25—and 
then rapidly. From December 30 to the end of January 1925, there were 216 tax conferences in 
small- and medium-sized towns throughout the state (see Figure 1). Arnold was stunned at how 
rapidly the tax clubs took hold in even the remotest Texas towns. “Remarkable as it may seem,” 
he wrote, “we find small towns show much deeper interest than the large ones, at least they are 
more expressive.”14  
<comp: insert Fig 1 about here> 
The participants in the tax clubs were overwhelmingly bankers (see Table 1). Systematic 
data on the activists come from a petition signed by the taxpayers who chaired the Texas tax 
conferences. Comparison of their names and towns to the directory listing in the September 1924 
edition of Polk’s Bankers’ Encyclopedia yields the conclusion that bank presidents made up the 
great majority of tax conference chairmen, at 76 percent; other bank officers and directors made 
up the next largest group, at 17 percent; and all other occupations—comprising 99.9 percent of 
Texas adults—presumably accounted for the remaining 7 percent of the tax conference 
chairmen.15 Some additional information about the gender and ethnicity of the participating 
bankers could be inferred from their directory listings. Only one of them was a woman (Mrs. 
Anna Martin, president of the Commercial Bank in Neches). Only one had an identifiably 
Spanish surname (Mr. F. Vaello Puig, president of the Merchants’ Exchange Bank in Victoria). 
We may infer that none were African American from the fact that none of the tax conference 
chairmen worked for any of the state’s handful of black-owned banks.16 These statistics represent 
chairmen who called the tax conferences. The citizens who showed up for the conferences were 
slightly more occupationally diverse, but not much. A petition from a taxpayers’ conference in 
Fort Worth on October 30, 1924, lists the occupation of every individual on the “resolutions 
committee”; seven of fourteen were bankers, three were merchants, two were cattlemen, one 
owned a lumberyard, and one listed his occupation merely as “capitalist.”17 At a Houston 
meeting of November 15, the thirty-four signatories were all businessmen, and the nine who 
indicated their occupation more specifically than that were all bankers.18 Compared to the 
population of Texas, the tax club activists were a homogeneous group of white male bankers. 
<comp: insert Table 1 about here> 
Few of these tax club activists can have been rich enough to enjoy lower tax rates under 
the Mellon plan. Any taxpayer who exceeded Mellon’s proposed top marginal rate was making 
at least $68,000, an income that was far above the pay of the typical Texas bank executive: the 
Federal Reserve Bulletin reports that the average federal reserve member bank in the Dallas 
district in 1924 was paying a total of $27,481 in wages, salaries, and dividends to all of its 
employees and investors combined.19 Fewer than 188 income taxpayers in the entire state of 
Texas in 1924 would benefit personally from the proposed reduction in the top marginal tax 
rate.20 It is safe to assume that most of these rich taxpayers were concentrated in a few big cities. 
The typical tax conference, by contrast, took place in a rural county where fewer than seven 
people had taxable incomes over $10,000.21 For the most part, the tax club activists who spoke 
up for the rich were not pleading for lower taxes on their own incomes.  
It was not high incomes that united the tax club activists. It was their position in the farm 
mortgage industry. As we shall see, their objection to the income tax was the threat that high tax 
rates advantaged their competitors in the financial industry. In particular, bankers feared that 
high tax rates would lead investors to put their savings in tax-exempt bonds—which most rural 
mortgage banks could not issue, but which their competitors could.  
 
<1> The Productive and the Unproductive  
 
All of the Texas tax clubs identified high surtax rates on the top income brackets as a threat to 
business, especially business in Texas. The citizens assembled for the Dallas tax meeting two 
weeks later asserted that cutting the top rate of income tax was “essential to maintaining our 
financial equilibrium and to the development of the Southwest.”22 The assembled chairmen of 
the Texas tax conferences signed a petition to their senators that described high tax rates in the 
top brackets as “a National emergency” because high tax rates interfered with “the business 
requirements of the country.”23  
But why did they perceive high tax rates as an emergency? The activists who spoke for 
the tax clubs invariably seized on the existence of tax-exempt debt as the first—and sometimes 
the only—grievance that led them to favor income tax cuts. The tax conference at Fort Worth 
began its petition for income tax cuts by complaining that the Revenue Act of 1924 had failed to 
effect “the diversion of capital from tax exempt to productive securities.”24 Businessmen from 
Houston opened their petition with the same complaint: “At a conference of business men here 
today, the effect of the present revenue act upon business activity of this section was reviewed 
and we find that the surtax and inheritance tax rates in the higher brackets are diverting capital 
into tax exempt securities and discouraging business activities.”25 The chairman of the Dallas tax 
conference called the assembled citizens to order with a call for “tax reform which will divert the 
flow of capital from tax exempt securities to private enterprises.”26 The petition of the state’s tax 
conference chairmen to their senators made this demand explicit: their priority was an income 
tax reduction; but “[i]f we cannot have tax reduction, then we should have tax reform with the 
least possible delay with the schedules so revised that the source of revenue will not be 
destroyed, but rather enlarged, by more nearly equalizing the income from tax-exempt and 
taxable securities.”27 J. A. Arnold, who had helped to recruit many of the tax club chairmen, 
wrote to the Treasury to report that this was their top priority: “Our people are as much 
concerned in reducing the surtax rates to a point where capital will be released for investment in 
productive enterprises as in tax reduction as such.”28 Ending the tax privilege for bonds was the 
most important thing; cutting the top income tax rate was a means to an end. The first bulletin of 
the American Taxpayers’ League, issued in January 1925, reported on tax conferences in Texas, 
Louisiana, and Virginia that had demanded even deeper tax cuts than those proposed in the 
Mellon Plan. The bulletin justified their demands by providing careful estimates of how lower 
income tax rates would affect the high-income investor’s choice between stocks and tax-exempt 
bonds.29 The tax exemption was the issue. 
Activists distinguished between investors in “productive” enterprise and investors in tax-
exempt land banks, which they implicitly disparaged as unproductive. The letterhead of the 
American Taxpayers’ League drew this line in the sand by describing it as an organization “To 
Protect and Promote the Interests of those Engaged in Productive Pursuits.”30 The adjective 
might seem odd—it was an association of bankers, not farmers, or manufacturers, or laborers—
but in the discourse about the Mellon Plan, “productive” was used as a term that distinguished 
equity investment and taxable debt instruments from tax-exempt bonds. Mellon himself called 
tax-exempt bonds “safe but unproductive forms of investment” in Taxation: The People’s 
Business. In other passages, he treated “productive” as the semantic opposite of “tax-exempt.”31 
So did many tax activists—as in the petition of the tax club chairmen, which spoke of the need to 
“divert capital from tax exempt to productive securities.”32 To say that the League favored the 
interests of those engaged in productive pursuits, then, was to say it did not favor the interests of 
the land banks. 
Comparative evidence also supports the hypothesis that the perceived threat posed by the 
land banks was indeed the proximate cause of mobilization. The two states in which the tax clubs 
took root most rapidly, organized in greatest numbers, and sent delegations to testify before 
Congress were Iowa and Texas.33 These states were set apart from other farming states not by 
their high incomes, nor by the severity of the farm mortgage crisis; farm mortgage foreclosure 
rates were among the highest in the country in Iowa, and somewhat below average in Texas.34 
The characteristic these states shared that set them apart from other states was the market 
penetration of the federal land banks. The six land banks licensed to lend in Texas had 
distributed $106 million in mortgage loans by October 31, 1924, more than twice as much as the 
next state (Iowa, at $51 million). No other state came close.35 
A final piece of evidence comes from the comparison of the activist banks—those whose 
officers and directors chaired tax meetings—to a representative group of nonactivist banks. The 
former were in counties with more farm mortgages, and held more assets (including mortgage 
notes), than the latter. They were also more likely to belong to the American Bankers’ 
Association.  
These conclusions come from a statistical analysis of a sample of Texas banks operating 
in the fall of 1924. The analysis is complicated by observational dependence among the banks: 
there was only one tax conference per town, and therefore one tax conference chairman, so many 
bank officers in larger towns failed to convene tax conferences simply because the role of 
chairman was already taken by one of the other bankers in town. In order to focus the 
comparison on bankers who actually had the opportunity to participate as tax conference 
chairmen, I took a stratified random sample of Texas banks operating in September 1924 from 
Polk’s Bankers’ Encyclopedia. The sample included all banks whose directors or officers chaired 
tax conferences, and one randomly selected bank from each Texas town listed in the 
Encyclopedia that did not have a tax conference. The result was a sample of 955 banks, of which 
204 had led tax meetings. For each bank in the data set, I recorded selected financial and 
organizational information and town characteristics reported in the Encyclopedia. I also merged 
each record geographically with county-level data on 1924 tax returns, election returns, 
agricultural property relations, and population characteristics.36 The resulting sample yielded 845 
cases with complete data, including 167 tax conference conveners and 658 other banks. 
The comparison supports the view that farm mortgage exposure made a difference. Table 
2 reports a brief descriptive profile of the two groups of banks. The banks differed slightly, but 
measurably, in their ratio of debt to assets, suggesting that large asset-holders were more likely 
to support the Mellon Plan. They also differed slightly in the percentage of mortgaged farmers in 
their counties, suggesting that the participating banks probably held a relatively high proportion 
of their assets in farm mortgage notes. This difference is consistent with the hypothesis that the 
tax clubs were led by people who faced competition from the land banks. 
<comp: insert Table 2 about here> 
The participating banks were also substantially more likely than nonparticipating banks 
to belong to the American Bankers’ Association, the principal organization that had lobbied 
against the tax exemption for federal land banks. We should regard membership in this 
association only as a proxy for prior political mobilization and contact among bankers; the ABA 
itself did not contribute resources to the formation of tax clubs. Although the national ABA 
endorsed the Mellon Plan, the leadership was anxious to distinguish itself from the tax clubs, and 
even insisted that the latter change the name of their network from the American Bankers’ 
League to the American Taxpayers’ League in order to avoid any confusion on the subject.37 
That did not stop the ABA member banks from using their contacts with one another to 
propagate the tax club model throughout Texas.38 
Membership in the ABA and exposure to the farm mortgage market appear to have made 
a difference even after controlling for other characteristics of banks and their communities. Table 
3 reports the results of a series of multi-level logistic regression models that treat the probability 
of convening a tax conference as a function of bank-level and county-level covariates.39 The 
table shows that banks with low self-reported ratios of debt to assets were especially likely to 
participate. This conventional measure of financial strength suggests that the participating banks 
were those at the least immediate risk of business failure due to a bank run by depositors. But the 
greater threat in rural banking in this period was on the asset side of the ledger: the risk of farm 
mortgages that would never be repaid. The participating banks were indeed in counties where an 
unusually high percentage of owner-operated farms were mortgaged, suggesting that many of 
their assets probably took the form of default-prone farm mortgage notes. Finally, the 
participating banks were clearly distinguished by their membership in the ABA, net of all of 
these other factors. 
<comp: insert Table 3 about here> 
Most other characteristics of banks and their communities appear to have made no 
difference. The local availability of rich patrons does not help us distinguish participating banks: 
the presence of affluent taxpayers (those reporting $10,000 or more in taxable income) made no 
measurable difference net of other covariates. In most other respects, participating and 
nonparticipating banks were similar. Their social contexts were nearly identical. Their counties 
were comparably white and had comparable proportions of high-bracket income tax payers. 
They were not politically distinguishable, whether in their propensity to vote for Calvin 
Coolidge, whose administration produced the Mellon Plan, or in their propensity to vote for the 
Ku Klux Klan–identified Democratic Senator Earle Mayfield. Nor were they concentrated in the 
Congressional district of John Nance Garner, who was a prominent opponent of the Mellon Plan.  
The greatest difference between the social contexts of participants and nonparticipants 
concerned the size of their respective communities. The average tax club chairman was in charge 
of a bank in a town of 7,248 people, compared to 1,555 people for nonactivist banks. Contrary to 
J. A. Arnold’s first impression, it appears that bankers in large and medium-sized towns were 
more likely to convene tax conferences than bankers in small towns—perhaps because larger 
towns were more likely to provide a critical mass of bankers and business owners.  
The last column of Table 3 reports a trimmed model that includes only those independent 
variables that attained significance at the p<.20 level in at least one specification. This relatively 
parsimonious statistical model is strongly preferred by the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC). 
For ease of interpretation, Table 4 translates the coefficients from this trimmed model into 
marginal effects, representing the change in the simulated probability of holding a tax conference 
associated with an increase of each independent variable from one standard deviation below its 
mean to one standard deviation above its mean, if all the other variables could have been held 
constant at their mean values. The two greatest effects in absolute value are the local population, 
which increased the probability that a bank would convene a tax conference by 16 percentage 
points, and the debt-to-assets ratio, which decreased it by nine percentage points. But the third 
greatest effect was associated with membership in the ABA, which increased the probability of 
convening a tax conference by eight percentage points.  
<comp: insert Table 4 about here> 
In short, the comparison of participating and nonparticipating banks supports the 
hypothesis that the Texas Tax Club movement was not motivated by activists’ own quest for tax 
breaks. Instead, it was an attempt to reshape the farm mortgage market by depriving land banks 
of capital. Country bankers thought the Farm Loan Act tilted the playing field in favor of the 
federal land banks. They sought to tilt it back. 
 
<1> Conclusion: Bankers into Populists  
 
This article solves a historical and sociological puzzle—how the Mellon Plan, which targeted 
deep tax cuts to a handful of America’s richest citizens, inspired grassroots mobilization by 
people who were not themselves rich enough to enjoy very great tax cuts under the plan. 
Contemporary progressives saw the tax clubs as a catspaw for the Mellon Treasury and the 
eastern financial establishment. Their judgment has been echoed by scholars who have portrayed 
the tax club participants as dupes or as stooges. This article presents evidence that the tax club 
activists were responding to local conditions in their industry. The clubs were peopled by 
country bankers in markets where they were competing with federal land banks. Their demands 
indicated that they saw the Mellon Plan primarily as a way to equalize the tax rates between tax-
exempt debt and taxable securities. Farm mortgage lenders saw tax cuts for the rich as a way to 
increase the return on investment for people much richer than them—and thereby lure those rich 
investors away from tax-exempt securities that were fueling the expansion of land banks.  
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Fig. 1. Reported Texas tax conferences per day, December 30, 1924, to January 22, 1925. 
 
 
 
Source: Nathan Adams to Andrew Mellon, January 10, 1925; and Nathan Adams to Andrew 
Mellon, January 27, 1925, both in Office of the Treasury (RG 56), Correspondence, Central Files 
of the Office of the Secretary of the Treasury, 1917–1932 (Entry 191), Box no. 163, Folder Tax 
(General), January–April 1925. 
 
Note: The figure omits twenty-one meetings reported to have taken place in January 1925, the 
precise dates of which were not recorded. 
  
Fig. 2. Why were Texas and Iowa the centers of tax club agitation? 
Total federal land-bank mortgage loans in $1,000s, by state, August 7, 1916, to October 31, 1924 
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Table 1. The social base of the Texas tax clubs: white men in charge of banks 
 
 
 Tax conference 
conveners, October 
1924–January 1925 
All Texas adults 
16 years of age 
and older, 1920 
Occupation   
 Bank president 76.3 percent (167)  
}0.1 percent 
 Other bank officer or director 16.9 percent (37) 
 Other occupation 6.8 percent (15) 99.9 percent 
   
Gender (banking industry sub-sample only) 
 Men 99.5 percent (203) 52.5 percent 
 Women 0.5 percent (1) 47.5 percent 
   
Race and ethnicity (banking industry sub-sample only) 
 White, non-Spanish surname 99.5 percent (203) 79.3 percent 
 Spanish surname 0.5 percent (1) 4.8 percent 
 Black 0 percent (0) 15.9 percent 
 
Sources: Nathan Adams to Andrew Mellon, January 10, 1925; and Nathan Adams to Andrew 
Mellon, January 27, 1925, Box 163, Folder Tax (General), January–April 1925, RG 56, Entry 
191. 
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Table 2. Social and political context did not distinguish the participating banks 
 
 Tax 
conference 
conveners  
(N=187) 
All other banks 
in sample  
(N=658) 
 
Characteristics of the bank 
Debt ratio (debt to assets) 1.03* 1.07 
Loan ratio (loans to all assets) 0.61 0.61 
ABA member 68 percent* 44 percent 
 
Contextual characteristics of the town 
Population 7,248* 1,555 
 
Contextual characteristics of the county 
Farms mortgaged 
 as percent of owner-operated farms in county 
39 percent* 36 percent 
Located in John Nance Garner’s Congressional District 5 percent 6 percent 
Coolidge presidential vote share, 1924 
 as percent of county 
20 percent 18 percent 
Mayfield senatorial vote share, 1922 
 as percent of county 
67 percent 67 percent 
Affluent taxpayers (reporting incomes $10,000 and over)  
as percent of county residents 
7 percent 6 percent 
White native-born people as percent of county residents 81 percent 80 percent 
County had a Texas Farmers’ Union chapter, 
c. 1904–1906 
 
66 percent 70 percent 
 
* Difference is statistically significant at the p<.05 level. 
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Table 3. Financial position and organizational networks predicted banks’ involvement: 
Results from multilevel logistic regression models 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Sociodemographic context 
Population (natural log) .60 
(.08)*** 
   .49  
(.09)*** 
.48 
(.09)*** 
Affluent taxpayers 
(percent of population)a 
0.27 
(1.08) 
   -.23  
(1.2) 
 
White native-born 
(percent of population)a 
.01 
(.007)+ 
   .002  
(.008) 
.003  
(.008) 
Partisan context 
John Nance Garner’s 
Congressional District? 
(1=yes)a 
 -.22  
(.38) 
  -.55  
(.49) 
 
Coolidge vote, 1924 
(percent)a 
 .014  
(.009) 
  .008  
(.01) 
.006 
(.010) 
Mayfield vote, 1922 
(percent)a 
 -.0007  
(.006) 
  -.004  
(.007) 
 
Financial position 
Debt ratio   -1.51 
(.61)* 
 -1.54  
(.70)* 
-1.50 
(.69)* 
Loan ratio   .052 
(.50)+ 
 .37  
(.55) 
 
Farms mortgaged (percent)a   .012 
(.006)* 
 .013  
(.008)+ 
.012 
(.007)+ 
Organizational networks 
Member, American 
Bankers’ Association 
(1=yes) 
   1.20 
(0.18)*** 
.50  
(.21)* 
.54  
(.21)* 
Local chapter of Texas 
Farmers’ Union (1=yes)a 
   -0.10 
(0.20) 
.13  
(.30) 
 
Model statistics 
n banks 953 902 896 955 845 872 
N counties 238 229 236 239 226 232 
Std. dev. of county-level 
random intercepts (SE) 
.68  
(.16) 
.51  
(.16) 
.66  
(.15) 
.59  
(.19) 
.65  
(.17) 
.66  
(.17) 
BIC 948.85 979.35 943.35 961.63 901.23 883.85 
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a county-level covariate; + p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001 
 
 
 
Table 4. The big effects: large towns, small debts, prior organization, and lots of loans to farmers 
 
 Increase from... to... Effect on predicted 
probability of convening 
a tax conference 
Ln(population) 5.7 7.9 +16 percent 
Debt ratio 0.8 1.3 -9 percent 
ABA member No Yes +8 percent 
Farms mortgaged in county 20 percent 53 percent +6 percent 
Coolidge vote, 1924 9 percent 29 percent +2 percent 
White native-born  65 percent 95 percent +1 percent 
 
Note: Effects are calculated from trimmed model 6. For continuous variables, these effects 
represent the increase in the predicted probability associated with an increase from one standard 
deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean, holding all other variables 
constant at their observed values. 
 
 
 
